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In 1965, the Schencks saved enough money to construct an addition 
to their home in St. Bernard Parish.1 For a price of $2,260, the Schencks 
were set to expand their vision of the American Dream.2 That dream, 
however, would never be realized. One month after signing the contract, 
nearly six feet of water poured into the home.3 Construction had barely 
begun on the addition, but no one could have foreseen the wrath of 
Hurricane Betsy.4 The Schencks lost most of their belongings and needed 
to renovate their home.5 Consequently, the family could no longer afford 
the addition as contemplated in the contract and refused both to pay and to 
allow future work on the home.6 The construction company sued the 
Schencks for payment for work done along with liquidated damages.7 
Although the Louisiana court expressed sympathy for the family, it held 
that Louisiana’s force majeure doctrine was too strict to provide any relief 
to the Schencks.8 
Like the Schencks, Louisiana families and businesses continue to 
experience unprecedented disasters.9 The August 2016 floods and Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 wreaked havoc on Louisiana.10 In 2017, Louisiana narrowly 
missed massive destruction from Hurricane Harvey amidst rebuilding from 
the devastating 2016 floods.11 If the Schencks or other families recovering 
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 1. See Schenck v. Capri Constr. Co., 194 So. 2d 378 (La. Ct. App. 1967). 
 2. See id. 
 3. Id. at 379. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 379–80. 
 9. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina resulted in one of the worst natural disasters 
in U.S. history when it made landfall near New Orleans, and, in 2016, Baton 
Rouge experienced a “1000-year” flood that destroyed many homes and 
businesses. See generally Amy Wold, NOAA: Climate change played significant 
role in Louisiana’s torrential August rainfall, ADVOCATE (Sept. 7, 2016), 
https://www.theadvocate .com/baton_rouge/news/environment/article_dc458f5e- 
750b-11e6-a0dd-93b70f9bfa04.html [https://perma.cc/4YXL-ANF8]. 
 10. Campbell Robertson & Alan Blinder, After Baton Rouge Flooding, Learning 
Lessons from New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2016/08/23/us/baton-rouge-flooding-lessons-katrina.html?_r=0 [https://perma 
.cc/WE7D-TMMP]. 
 11. See Mark Schleifstein, Louisiana Flood of 2016 resulted from ‘1,000-year’ 
rain in 2 days, TIMES PICAYUNE (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.nola.com/weather 




from destruction lived in France—Louisiana’s original source for its 
contract law—the law would have required that the parties, with the court’s 
help, find a way to adjust the contract so that no party was ruined 
financially.12 If the Schencks or similarly situated families lived elsewhere 
in the United States, the law would have provided for a more equitable 
result than enforcing the contract against a family on the verge of financial 
ruin.13 
Although much of the world allows for contractual flexibility when 
unexpected circumstances arise, Louisiana has stubbornly resisted 
changes such as impracticability or hardship, ignoring national and 
international trends and continuing to apply its strict force majeure 
doctrine.14 Presently, Louisiana requires performance to be physically 
impossible for a party to obtain relief when disaster strikes.15 In contrast,  
France recently added a new civil code article to increase flexibility 
beyond traditional force majeure after over 200 years of mirroring 
Louisiana.16 Although lawmakers have attempted to relax Louisiana’s law 
of impossibility, these attempts have had little to no impact.17 Louisiana 
law continues to serve as an inequitable roadblock to people the state’s 
frequent natural disasters affect. 
The most realistic solution to Louisiana’s inflexible approach to force 
majeure is a legislative revision of the Louisiana Civil Code because the 
leading solution—requiring an extensive interpretation of the Civil 
Code—failed.18 A revision to the Code should take into account the realities 
of Louisiana’s mixed jurisdictional status.19 A survey of three general 
approaches other jurisdictions use to move beyond outright impossibility 
illuminates potential solutions for Louisiana to expand its law beyond the 
force majeure doctrine into cases of impracticability, imprévision, and 
hardship: (1) the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) and American 
                                                                                                             
/index.ssf/2016/08/louisiana_flood_of_2016_result.html [https://perma.cc/6Q5J-Y 
X5J]. 
 12. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1195 (Fr.). 
 13. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). 
 14. See generally Charles Tabor, Comment, Dusting Off the Code: Using 
History to Find Equity in Louisiana Contract Law, 68 LA. L. REV. 549, 560 (2008). 
 15. See generally Saul Litvinoff, Force Majeure, Failure of Cause and 
Theorie de l’Imprévision: Louisiana Law and Beyond, 46 LA. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
 16. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1195 (Fr.). 
 17. See Litvinoff, supra note 15; see also Tabor, supra note 14. 
 18. Tabor, supra note 14, at 565; see also Litvinoff, supra note 15. 
 19. See generally Vernon V. Palmer, The Many Guises of Equity in a Mixed 
Jurisdiction: A Functional View of Equity in Louisiana, 69 TUL. L. REV. 7, 8–9 
(1994) (explaining generally how Louisiana is a mixed jurisdiction). 




common law; (2) the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods (“CISG”) and Unidroit Principles; and (3) the French Civil Code.20 
These approaches are most relevant because French civil law and 
American common law legal principles frequently are, and historically 
have been, used in the development of Louisiana law;21 and the CISG, 
along with its contemporary, Unidroit,22 are rare attempts to reconcile and 
modernize both common law and civil law legal systems.23 Based on a 
careful weighing of these three approaches, Louisiana should add a 
provision to the Civil Code’s section on obligations to reflect the French 
model because the French model overcomes the weaknesses of the other 
solutions, such as narrow remedies and imprecision, but retains strengths, 
such as flexibility and binding force of contract. 
Part I of this Comment explains Louisiana’s force majeure doctrine, 
distinguishes it from similar doctrines in other jurisdictions, and 
demonstrates the inequitable development of Louisiana’s law regarding 
force majeure. Part II discusses the two major failed attempts to introduce 
more flexibility into Louisiana’s force majeure doctrine. Part III surveys 
and analyzes three relevant sources of law that Louisiana should look to 
in constructing a workable application of hardship or imprévision: (1) the 
common law—doctrines and U.C.C.; (2) international law—the CISG and 
Unidroit; and (3) French law. Part IV argues that the French solution is 
best because it incorporates important concepts from the other solutions 
also providing an equitable approach and resolution to disputes and 
concludes that because the French solution is simple and compatible with 
Louisiana law, it would reduce inequities created by the current regime. 
                                                                                                             
 20. See generally U.C.C. § 2-615 (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1977); United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods art. 79, Apr. 11, 1981, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262, 6264–80 (1987), 1489 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter CISG]; Art. 6.2.2 UNIDROIT Principles 2010; CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] 
[CIVIL CODE] art. 1195 (Fr.). 
 21. See generally Tabor, supra note 14, at 565 (discussing common sources 
the legislature has used to develop Louisiana law). 
 22. The Unidroit Principles serve as an international restatement of contracts 
and the CISG inspured them. See Joseph M. Perillo, Unidroit Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 281, 283 (1994). 
 23. See Brandon Nagy, Comment, Unreliable Excuses: How Do Differing 
Persuasive Interpretations of CISG Article 79 Affect its Goal of Harmony?, 26 
N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 61 (2013). 




I. LOUISIANA’S STRICT APPLICATION OF FORCE MAJEURE AND THE 
HARSH CONSEQUENCES 
Force majeure is a doctrine in the law of obligations that provides an 
obligor relief from damages when any obstacle renders the obligor’s 
performance impossible.24 A court may discharge an obligor from his 
obligation when a supervening event occurs through a “foreign cause,” 
and the event is insurmountable rather than merely onerous or expensive.25 
The most straightforward application of the doctrine is to natural disasters 
that make performance impossible.26 Nevertheless, Louisiana courts have 
so restrictively applied force majeure that various individuals have been 
left with no remedy even when natural disasters impede performance of 
contracts.27 
A. Force Majeure as a Louisiana Civil Law Doctrine 
The doctrine of force majeure dates back to Roman law, which 
described it as impossibilium nulla obligation.28 French civil law adopted 
force majeure in the Code Napoléon in 1804, and the idea is also present 
in the common law doctrines of “frustration” and “impossibility of 
performance.”29 Force majeure is likewise related to the well-known 
common law “act of God” defense.30 The act of God defense typically 
involves a supervening event an extraordinary act of nature causes.31 
Compared to force majeure, the act of God defense embodies a much 
narrower spectrum of events because force majeure can apply beyond 
                                                                                                             
 24. Litvinoff, supra note 15, at 1. 
 25. PLANIOL, OBLIGATIONS § 231, in 2 TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 
139 (11th ed. 1959). 
 26. Id. at 140. 
 27. See, e.g., Losecco v. Gregory, 32 So. 985 (La. 1901); Schenck v. Capri 
Constr. Co., 194 So. 2d 378 (La. Ct. App. 1967). Although natural disasters are 
overwhelmingly cited as the supervening event causing force majeure in 
Louisiana jurisprudence, acts of the government can also trigger the doctrine. See, 
e.g., MIE Properties-LA, L.L.C. v. Huff, No. 2011 CA 0258, 2012 WL 1203373 
(La. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2012). 
 28. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 759 (1990). Impossibilium nulla 
obligation means “there is no obligation to do the impossible.” E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 9.5 (4th ed. 2004). 
 29. See EWAN MCKENDRICK, FORCE MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF 
CONTRACT 6 (1991); Litvinoff, supra note 15, at 6. 
 30. See 1 AM. JUR. 2d Act of God § 1 (2017). 
 31. Id. 




natural disasters to labor strikes, war, and acts of third parties, such as a 
carrier’s non-delivery of goods.32 
Under Louisiana law, force majeure is directly connected to the civil 
law theory of cause.33 Cause is a necessary element of all contracts in 
Louisiana law.34 According to the Civil Code, “[c]ause is the reason why 
a party obligates himself.”35 Thus, if the cause for the contract fails, then 
the entire obligation never existed.36 Impossibility of performance 
involves a circumstance that upsets the cause or reason for the obligation.37 
Although cause is a leading rationale behind Louisiana’s force majeure 
doctrine, other civil law jurisdictions, like France, rely on the parties’ 
opportunity to resist the event and the parties’ fault to explain force 
majeure.38 Under the French approach, force majeure occurs when resisting 
the supervening event is impossible, provided the parties take reasonable 
precautions to avoid the event.39 The French approach, therefore, is similar 
to a tort analysis—including concepts of foreseeability and fault—rather 
than an analysis of the elements of contract like the Louisiana approach.40 
In Louisiana, performance must be “truly impossible” to satisfy the 
requirements for force majeure.41 True impossibility exists when 
performance is physically impossible, unless the obligor’s fault triggers the 
impossibility, in which case the obligor remains bound.42  
Force majeure is distinguishable from both the French theorie 
l’imprévision, or hardship doctrine, and the common law doctrine of 
                                                                                                             
 32. See PLANIOL, supra note 25, § 232, at 140. 
 33. Litvinoff, supra note 15, at 14–15. 
 34. Id. at 14. 
 35. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1967 (2018). 
 36. Litvinoff, supra note 15. A mere failure of cause is different from an 
absolutely null cause. See, e.g., SAUL LITVINFOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 17.3, in 5 
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 17.3 (2d ed. 2017). 
Failure of cause results in an obligation that does not exist anymore whereas an 
unlawful cause results in absolute nullity for a cause that does exist but the law 
does not permit. Id. 
 37. See Litvinoff, supra note 15, at 14–15. 
 38. See HUGH BEALE, ARTHUR HARTKAMP, HEIN KÖTZ & DENIS TALLON, 
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON CONTRACT LAW 595 (2002). 
 39. See Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 1re, 
Mar. 9, 1994, Bull. civ. I, No. 91 (Fr.); BEALE, supra note 38, at 595. 
 40. See supra note 39.  
 41. Litvinoff, supra note 15, at 1. 
 42. AUBRY & RAU, OBLIGATIONS § 331, in 4 DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 260 
(A.N. Yiannopoulos trans., 6th ed. 1965). 




commercial impracticability.43 Modern French doctrine defines imprévision 
as a situation in which an unpredictable change in circumstances renders a 
contract unbalanced, making performance of the contract exceptionally 
difficult.44 Similarly, the American doctrine of impracticability relieves an 
obligor from performance when a change in circumstances makes an 
obligor’s performance excessively burdensome or costly.45 Louisiana’s law 
differs from both of these doctrines because Louisiana does not provide a 
remedy for “exceptionally difficult” or “excessively burdensome” 
contracts—instead, the obligation must meet the much higher of standard of 
“truly impossible.”46 
B. Louisiana’s Force Majeure Doctrine: A Tale of Inflexibility 
The drafters of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 borrowed force 
majeure from the Code Napoléon, enshrining the principle forever in 
Louisiana law.47 Although the placement of the force majeure provision has 
varied in the Code over the years, the present article preserves the same legal 
principle as in its debut.48 The present force majeure doctrine originated in 
canon law.49 Canon lawyers saw breach of contract as a sin, which led to the 
strict philosophy of pacta sunt servanda, or “contracts must be honored.”50 
As natural law philosophers in the 17th century began advocating the idea 
of rebus sic stantibus, meaning “provided circumstances remain 
unchanged,” one exception to the strict canon law was recognized: force 
majeure.51 The Code Napoléon, the source of Louisiana’s law, adopted the 
pacta sunt servanda philosophy combined with the force majeure 
exception.52 
                                                                                                             
 43. See Litvinoff, supra note 15, at 3; G.H. TREITEL, FRUSTRATION AND 
FORCE MAJEURE 238 (1994). 
 44. Fiches d’orientation: Imprévision, DALLOZ-AVOCATS (Apr. 2017), 
http://www.dalloz-avocats.fr/documentation/Document?id=DZ/OASIS/001520  
[https://perma.cc/V5NC-ZZPJ]. 
 45. K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 531 
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998). 
 46. See Litvinoff, supra note 15, at 1. 
 47. Id. 
 48. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1873 (2018); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1873 
cmt. a (2018) (emphasizing that the article does not change the law). 
 49. Tabor, supra note 14, at 553–54. Canon law is the body of legal doctrine 
the Catholic Church developed. See generally id. at 553, n.21.  
 50. Id. at 553. 
 51. Id. at 554–56. 
 52. Id. at 554–55. 




The Louisiana Supreme Court applied force majeure narrowly from 
the beginning in three illustrative cases.53 The earliest case regarding force 
majeure presented the court with tremendous difficulty, resulting in two 
rehearings.54 In Losecco v. Gregory, the plaintiff, a speculator in orange 
crops, contracted $8,000 to buy “all oranges [the] trees may produce” 
between 1899 and 1900.55 Unfortunately, a freeze in 1899 destroyed the 
entire grove of trees.56 The court struggled to reconcile the scope of an 
assumption of risk clause in the contract with the object of the aleatory57 
contract, a chance of getting orange crops.58 The court initially excused 
the plaintiff from paying all $8,000 and justified the decision based on 
failure of cause.59 On first rehearing, the court reversed its original 
decision, reasoning that a major freeze was somewhat foreseeable,  thus 
placing the freeze within the scope of the assumption of risk clause of the 
contract, despite finding that the freeze was not foreseeable in its original 
decision.60 Additionally, the court held that the plaintiff owed $4,000 for 
the 1899 crop but was still excused from paying the $4,000 for the 1900 
crop.61 Finally, on second rehearing, the court backtracked further by 
requiring the plaintiff to pay the entire $8,000.62 Citing numerous French 
                                                                                                             
 53. The latter two cases are summed up nicely in two recent Louisiana Bar 
Journal articles. See Jonathan Riley, The Civilian Lawyer: The Doctrine of 
Fortuitous Event, 56 LA. B.J. 36, 36–37 (2008); Christopher T. Chocheles, No 
Excuses: Hurricanes and the “Act of God” Defense to Breach of Contract Claims, 
57 LA. B.J. 380, 381–84 (2010). 
 54. Losecco v. Gregory, 32 So. 985 (La. 1901). 
 55. Id. at 986. 
 56. Id. 
 57. The language of the contract seemed to make it an aleatory contract—a 
contract for which performance depends on a future uncertain event. LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 1912 (2018); Losecco, 32 So. at 986. See also Contrat Aléatoire, 
DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE (1st ed. 2014): 
A contract the object of which is to cause the performances of the parties 
to depend on an uncertain event, the occurrence or the result of which 
will be that one will realize a gain and the other will experience a loss, 
whether the contract has for its purpose the pursuit of a chance of gain to 
start with (gamble, wager, lottery) or the search for a guaranty against a 
risk of loss (insurance) (each party accepting for itself a chance of gain 
or loss as per an uncertain event). 
 58. Losecco, 32 So. at 986–87. 
 59. The court reasoned that the assumption of risk clause was too broad and 
that the parties had contemplated that the trees would at least exist. Id. at 988. 
 60. See id. at 991. 
 61. Id. at 992. 
 62. Id. at 996. 




sources and the Louisiana Civil Code,63 the court concluded that the 
contract was a specific type of aleatory contract for a sale of a hope to get 
crops64 and that a sale of a hope inherently comes with an assumption that 
the purchaser may get nothing.65 
Two decades later, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Sickinger v. 
Board of Directors of Public Schools for the Parish of Orleans, in which 
the plaintiff contracted to sell his lot in exchange for the defendant moving 
the plaintiff’s house to the adjacent lot.66 When a hurricane partially 
destroyed the house, the defendant asserted force majeure; however, the 
court ruled that the defendant had assumed the risk of the storm and 
therefore should rebuild the house.67 Shortly thereafter, the court decided 
Dallas Cooperage & Woodenware Co. v. Creston Hoop Co., in which the 
defendant promised to deliver coiled elm hoops to the plaintiff.68 Even 
though excessive rainfall prevented the defendant from securing the 
goods, the court found that it would still be possible to perform through a 
third party.69 These early decisions reflect a narrow view of force majeure 
and set the stage for a literal interpretation of impossibility.70 
Several decades later, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal 
applyied force majeure in the Schenck case described in the introduction.71 
                                                                                                             
 63. Id. at 993–95. The court cited treatises from civil law scholars Pothier, 
Duranton, Troplong, Baudry-Lacantinerie, and Laurent. Id. 
 64. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2451 (2018) provides a definition for a sale of hope: 
A hope may be the object of a contract of sale. Thus, a fisherman may 
sell a haul of his net before he throws it. In that case the buyer is entitled 
to whatever is caught in the net, according to the parties’ expectations, 
and even if nothing is caught the sale is valid. 
 65. Losecco, 32 So. at 996. 
 66. Sickinger v. Bd. of Dirs. of Pub. Sch. for the Parish of Orleans, 85 So. 
212, 212–13 (La. 1920). 
 67. Id. at 215. Ironically, the court suggested that there was no way to know 
that the storm would imperil the contract. Indeed, the court said that hurricanes 
do not occur annually, but the mere fact that there is general awareness of 
hurricanes is enough for assuming the risk of the storm. For more discussion, see 
Chocheles, supra note 53, at 381–82. 
 68. Dallas Cooperage & Woodenware Co. v. Creston Hoop Co., 109 So. 844, 
844 (La. 1926). Coiled elm hoops are common in the trade of barrel making. They 
are used in the construction and sealing of barrels. See JOSEPH WAGNER, 
COOPERAGE: A TREATISE ON MODERN SHOP PRACTICE AND METHODS; FROM THE 
TREE TO THE FINISHED ARTICLE 304 (1910). 
 69. Dallas Cooperage, 109 So. 844 at 844; Riley, supra note 53, at 36–37. 
 70. See Riley, supra note 53, at 36; Chocheles, supra note 53, at 381. 
 71. Schenck v. Capri Constr. Co., 194 So. 2d 378 (La. Ct. App. 1967). See 
also discussion supra Introduction. 




In dicta, the court expressed sympathy for the plaintiff’s position.72 
Nevertheless, the Schenck court relied on the rule in Dallas Cooperage 
and held that former Civil Code article 1933 on force majeure applied only 
when performance was impossible rather than merely burdensome.73 
Although the court remained inflexible in applying force majeure, the 
sympathy in dicta suggested that more flexibility was appropriate.74 
Louisiana courts’ overreliance on strict force majeure jurisprudence 
illustrates the necessity for a legislative solution to the inflexibility.75 
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, force majeure litigation returned to 
the stage.76 Although commentary regarding more flexibility had begun to 
surface,77 Louisiana’s Fourth Circuit continued the strict force majeure 
tradition in Associated Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Carbone Properties.78 In 
Associated Acquisitions, the plaintiff owned an interest in Carbone, a 
company building a Hilton Inn in New Orleans.79 After Hurricane Katrina 
damaged the property, Carbone argued that the increased cost of 
construction associated with the storm made interest payments on a 
promissory note to Associated Acquisitions impossible.80 Carbone 
premised its impossibility argument on the fact that the bank had 
terminated its construction loan and that the hotel franchise agreement 
ended.81 Nevertheless, the court ruled for Associated Acquisitions, once 
again relying on Dallas Cooperage and now on Schenck, holding that 
Carbone must pay the interest on the promissory note in full because 
payment was possible despite the means becoming more difficult.82 
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal subsequently endorsed 
the Dallas Cooperage, Schenck, and Associated Acquisitions holdings in 
2008, when a seller refused to honor a pre-hurricane purchase agreement 
on his home because he could not complete repairs Hurricane Katrina 
                                                                                                             
 72. Schenck, 194 So. 2d at 380. 
 73. Id. at 379–80. 
 74. See id. at 380. 
 75. The court was explicit when it reasoned jurisprudence bound it. See id. at 
379–80. 
 76. See generally Chocheles, supra note 53, at 382. 
 77. See generally Litvinoff, supra note 15; but see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 
1873 cmt. a (2018) (emphasizing that the article does not change the law). 
 78. See Riley, supra note 53, at 37. 
 79. Associated Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Carbone Props. of Audubon, L.L.C., 
962 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
 80. Id. at 1104–05. 
 81. Id. at 1107. In the wake of the storm, Hilton and Carbone mutually agreed 
to terminate the franchise agreement, thus any hotel built would not be branded 
as a Hilton. Id. at n.6. 
 82. Id. at 1107–08. 




caused by the date of closing.83 In Payne v. Hurwitz, the court found that 
the seller’s bad faith in failing to renegotiate caused the impossibility 
rather than Hurricane Katrina.84 The court ruled for the buyers, relying on 
jurisprudence, Professor Litvinoff’s treatise on Louisiana civil law, and 
good faith.85 The court’s use of good faith illustrated an ability and 
willingness to use good faith in conjunction with force majeure;86 
however, the good faith analysis reinforced the strict jurisprudence rather 
than expanding force majeure.87 Thus, over a century of jurisprudence has 
led courts to refuse an expansion of force majeure to circumstances of 
excessively difficult performance. 
II. FAILED ATTEMPTS TO REVISE FORCE MAJEURE 
Although jurisprudence remained inflexible with regard to force 
majeure, Professor Litvinoff, a chief architect of the 1984 revision to the 
Civil Code’s section on obligations, wrote an extensive law review article 
detailing how application of the force majeure provision in Civil Code 
article 1873 could be more flexible.88 Litvinoff was concerned with the 
harsh consequences of strict impossibility when disasters make performance 
excessively burdensome.89 In 2008, Charles Tabor’s student comment 
echoed Professor Litvinoff’s concerns.90 The commentary suggested two 
primary solutions.91 Professor Litvinoff’s suggestion involved using general 
principles of the law and other code articles to modify the meaning of 
impossibility without amending the code.92 Tabor’s suggestion proposed a 
legislative amendment to the Code to make it more flexible.93 
                                                                                                             
 83. Payne v. Hurwitz, 978 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Chocheles, 
supra note 53, at 382. 
 84. Payne, 978 So. 2d at 1006–07. 
 85. Id. at 1005–07. The author does not necessarily disagree with the result 
in this case. Indeed, the specific facts in the case suggest foul play; however, the 
court’s endorsement of the inflexible approach to force majeure continues. 
 86. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1759 (2018) (“Good faith shall govern the conduct of 
the obligor and the obligee in whatever pertains to the obligation.”); see Litvinoff, 
supra note 15, at 19–20. 
 87. Payne, 978 So. 2d at 1005–07. 
 88. Litvinoff, supra note 15, at 3. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See generally Tabor, supra note 14. 
 91. See generally Litvinoff, supra note 15; Tabor, supra note 14. 
 92. See generally Litvinoff, supra note 15. 
 93. See generally Tabor, supra note 14. 




A. An Expansion Through Cause  
Professor Litvinoff demonstrated that courts could expand force 
majeure through civil law cause.94 He found two early French cases that 
dissolved contracts for cause after a change in circumstances made 
performance of an obligation much more difficult.95 In one case, a party 
became physically incapacitated, but performance did not actually require 
the incapacitated party himself to perform.96 In the other case, performance 
of the contract threatened the life of the obligor.97 In neither case was 
performance absolutely impossible, but the French courts nevertheless 
excused performance.98 
Professor Litvinoff also found that French courts have occasionally 
avoided harsh results by treating cause like the common law doctrine of 
frustration.99 In one case involving a hunting lease, authorities banned 
hunting in the area, and a French court used cause to reduce the rent.100 In 
another case, World War I physically displaced a tailor’s clients under 
long-term contracts, and the court dissolved the contract for lack of 
cause.101 Professor Litvinoff argued that the events that upset performance 
of the contracts prevented the parties from realizing the reason they 
entered the contract in the context of force majeure.102 In each of the 
French cases, an event destroyed the reason the parties entered into a 
contract, but the obligors’ performances in the form of payment remained 
possible.103 Accordingly, Litvinoff contended that a direct connection 
between cause and force majeure exists that can provide an avenue for 
broadening force majeure beyond strict impossibility.104 
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A rare and modern example of the cause theory in Louisiana appeared 
in MIE Properties-LA, L.L.C. v. Huff.105 In Huff, a woman leased space for 
a coffee shop but soon struggled for business when road construction 
closed off easy access to the shop.106 So few customers came that the 
woman could not pay her rent.107 When she was sued for breach of 
contract, the woman made a force majeure argument under article 1873.108 
The court held that the lease dissolved because of a failure of cause from 
force majeure.109 Notwithstanding Huff, recognition of cause in force 
majeure cases has been inconsistent, illustrating that Professor Litvinoff’s 
solution has been largely ignored.110 In fact, the cause solution is rare in 
Louisiana legal thought, as the French doctrine deemphasized cause to the 
point that lawmakers removed it as an element of conventional obligations 
in the 2016 revision of the French Civil Code.111 Because the natural 
remedy for an obligor seeking relief from a contract in which cause no 
longer exists is dissolution, relying on cause in force majeure cases results 
in an inversely inflexible approach as compared to the current one.112 
Instead of no remedy under the current inflexible force majeure law, the 
cause remedy would dissolve every impracticable contract even if 
renegotiation or revision were possible.113  
B. Using Good Faith to Adopt Imprévision 
Although cause is one method of expanding force majeure, flexibility 
would be better achieved by emphasizing Professor Litvinoff’s second 
component—reading force majeure in conjunction with the rule that 
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 111. See Mustapha Mekki, The French Reform of Contract Law: The Art of 
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 113. See Litvinoff, supra note 15, at 13–19 (discussing the classic effect of 
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parties must act in good faith.114 The roots of the French theorie 
l’imprévision rely on good faith to reach remedies, such as judicial 
adjustment of the contract, when performance becomes excessively onerous 
or difficult.115 To achieve the new remedies, the court must read an implicit 
condition into the parties’ contract that the obligation exists “provided 
circumstances remain unchanged.”116 The implied condition, coupled with 
the good faith that parties owe each other, encourages parties to cooperate 
and pursue remedies, such as revision, to keep the obligation intact when 
circumstances change.117 
In addition to increasing the number of remedies available to the parties, 
injecting a good faith analysis into force majeure cases would expand the 
doctrine beyond strict physical impossibility.118 Good faith is performance 
“in conformity with the intention of the parties and in the light of the purpose 
for which [agreements] have been formed.”119 German judges recognized 
that good faith was such an overarching principle of law that it superseded 
physical and legal impossibility in extreme circumstances.120 According to 
Professor Litvinoff, good faith as an overarching principle, as the Civil 
Code’s mandate that obligors perform in good faith illustrates, could yield 
the concept of “financial impossibility” in Louisiana.121 Indeed, German 
judges used this good faith reasoning to say that courts must deem a 
circumstance appearing “impossible to ordinary business common sense” 
force majeure.122 
Louisiana jurisprudence recognized an overriding principle of good 
faith long prior to the 1984 revision that emphasized good faith by 
establishing it as a general principle of all obligations.123 Prior to the 
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required a remedy with economic impossibility). 
 121. See Litvinoff, supra note 15, at 19–20. 
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revision, courts found good faith as a principle under conventional 
obligations.124 In modern decisions, courts have recognized the revised 
general principle of good faith.125 Therefore, Louisiana law is compatible 
with using good faith to increase flexibility in the application of remedy 
and scope of force majeure.126 Nevertheless, Louisiana courts have not 
adopted Professor Litvinoff’s ideas using cause, implicit conditions, and 
good faith in force majeure cases,127 possibly because the scheme requires 
a judge to make too many inferences or address the uncertainty and lack 
of clarity surrounding the definition of good faith.128 
C. Revising the Civil Code 
In his 2008 student comment, Tabor proposed the addition of 11 new 
articles to the Civil Code.129 The inspiration for the revision came from 
Unidroit Principles, Principles of European Contract Law (“PECL”), and 
eastern civil codes such as Uzbekistan’s.130 In the proposed articles, Tabor 
suggested codifying the general rule that contracts must be honored as 
written along with an exception to the rule when a “substantial change of 
circumstances” occurs.131 The subsequent proposed articles defined many 
of the terms in the exception.132 The final group of suggested articles 
reiterated what is already a rule—that good faith governs the parties’ 
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The Formation of Contracts & The Principles of European Contract Law, 13 
PACE INT’L L. REV. 371, 373 (2001). 
 131. Tabor, supra note 14, at 570–72. 
 132. Id. at 575–78. 




conduct—and gave the court explicit rules on how to resolve disputes 
arising from a “substantial change of circumstances” after contract 
formation.133 
Today, force majeure remains unrevised in the Louisiana Civil 
Code.134 Perhaps Tabor’s proposed revision was ignored because the 
complicated 11 article scheme is contrary to principles of the Code.135 The 
suggested scheme reads like a revised statute and departs substantially 
from the ease, flexibility, and generality that a civil code is designed to 
provide.136 Another reason the legislature may have ignored Tabor’s 
proposal could be that some of the sources used to inspire his scheme go 
beyond Louisiana’s traditional sources of legal inspiration, most of which 
have never been discussed in other Louisiana doctrine.137 Regardless, 
because the courts overlooked Litvinoff’s suggestions, and the legislature 
overlooked Tabor’s, the law remains rigid and unchanged. 
III. PLAUSIBLE SOLUTIONS IN RELATED JURISDICTIONS 
To find a more attractive solution than the previous suggestions, the 
remedy to the harsh outcomes of Louisiana’s force majeure doctrine 
should derive from United States sources, United States-influenced 
international sources, and French sources.138 Surveying the different 
sources reveals the aspects of each that Louisiana should adopt and the 
aspects that Louisiana should avoid in modernizing its law. Although some 
solutions may appear to deviate more from pacta sunt servanda than 
others, all move beyond Louisiana’s force majeure doctrine in a 
meaningful way. 
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A. The Common Law and Uniform Commercial Code 
The strict doctrine of impossibility in the early English common law 
amounted to a rule similar to Louisiana’s force majeure doctrine. 
Impossibility essentially required true impossibility where the only 
excuses for performance were: illegal contracts; death of the promisor; and 
total, physical destruction of the thing required for performance.139 The 
doctrine of frustration in England sparked the common law’s expansion of 
impossibility.140 Although American courts have retained England’s 
frustration principles,141 the doctrine of frustration evolved in the United 
States into the doctrine of commercial impracticability.142 The commercial 
impracticability doctrine was then codified into U.C.C. § 2-615.143 
Although § 2-615 codified the spirit of the common law, hints of a more 
expansive application, perhaps inspired by Germany, appear in the 
comments.144 Frustration, impracticability, and § 2-615 all reflect a more 
flexible approach to force majeure than that of Louisiana. 
1. Frustration 
Before the birth of the commercial impracticability doctrine, the 
doctrine of frustration appeared more accommodating than Louisiana’s 
law. The doctrine of frustration provides an excuse for failure to perform 
a contract when a party cannot fulfill an obligation because the 
circumstances produced a situation radically different from what the 
parties originally intended.145 In essence, frustration occurs when the basis 
for the contract is destroyed.146 The relation between frustration and the 
basis of the contract is nearly identical to civil law cause.147 The classic 
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example of frustration arose in English “coronation cases” involving the 
lease of rooms to watch King Edward VII’s coronation.148  
In Krell v. Henry,149 a frequently cited coronation case, the English 
Court of King’s Bench ruled frustration of contract existed between a 
lessor and lessee for a room to watch King Edward VII’s coronation.150 
Frustration occurred because the basis for the contract, to watch the King’s 
coronation, was destroyed when the King became ill and cancelled the 
coronation.151 The court held that payment for the room was excused 
despite the fact that leasing the room was still possible.152 
The modern English frustration doctrine has five governing principles: 
(1) frustration reduces injustice for “literal performance of absolute 
promises”; (2) courts should rarely invoke frustration because it discharges 
the entire contract; (3) frustration ends the contract immediately; (4) 
frustration cannot be self-induced; and (5) frustration cannot be the fault of 
a party.153 In the United States, frustration has been distilled even further 
into three elements: (1) the principal purpose of the contract must be 
destroyed; (2) the frustration must be substantial; and (3) the assumption 
during contract formation must have been that the frustrating event would 
not occur.154 Destruction of the principal purpose contemplates an object of 
the contract so fundamental that in its absence the transaction makes no 
sense.155 The substantiality requirement contemplates more than mere loss 
of profit, and the basic assumption requirement contemplates the parties’ 
belief that certain means of performance will continue to exist.156 Both 
England and the United States apply frustration retroactively to the contract, 
extinguishing the entire agreement if the standards are met.157 
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Although frustration has developed more than Louisiana’s force 
majeure, the consequences of frustration are still inflexible.158 Modern 
frustration functions similarly to failure of cause in Louisiana and also 
results in dissolution of the contract.159 Unlike other solutions found in the 
doctrine of imprévision, the doctrine of commercial impracticability, the 
U.C.C., and the CISG, frustration can only result in immediate dissolution 
of the contract.160 
2. American Commercial Impracticability 
Frustration’s more refined contemporary is the doctrine of 
impracticability, a doctrine that is best described as such: “In matters of 
business, a thing is said to be impossible when it is not practicable; and a 
thing is impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive or 
unreasonable cost.”161 The doctrine finds its roots in a 1916 California 
Supreme Court case, Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard.162 In Mineral Park, 
the contract required the defendants to remove gravel from the plaintiff’s 
land.163 The defendants removed half of the gravel but refused to remove 
the other half because it was underwater.164 The court ruled in favor of the 
defendants, reasoning that the gravel underwater could only be removed at 
“prohibitive cost.”165 Even though Mineral Park represented the birth of 
impracticability doctrine in the United States, it should not have.166 The 
event that made performance impracticable—the gravel being 
underwater—existed before the contract was made.167 Consequently, the 
case could have been decided based on common law “mistake” in 
contract.168 It is possible that Mineral Park coined impracticability to evade 
the difficult standards of mistake that would require proof of knowledge of 
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the underwater gravel rather than simply an error in predicting that all 
gravel would be recoverable.169 
The most controversial case applying impracticability with a 
supervening obstacle is Aluminum Corp. of America v. Essex Group Inc. 
(“ALCOA”).170 In ALCOA, Essex and ALCOA agreed to a price-fixing 
formula for the delivery and smelting of aluminum.171 The price-fixing 
formula eventually failed when electricity costs skyrocketed several years 
into the contract.172 ALCOA estimated that it would lose $75 million if it 
did not obtain judicial relief.173 The court ruled in favor of ALCOA on 
grounds of impracticability and granted relief by setting the contract price 
itself.174 In ALCOA, the American doctrine of impracticability came 
strikingly close to imprévision because the remedy granted for the excessive 
increase in cost was judicial adjustment of the contract.175 In justifying its 
novel remedy, the ALCOA court appeared to suggest that the holding was 
very narrow.176 The court noted the effort the parties made to avoid risks 
with a price-fixing mechanism and reasoned that modern commercial law 
should accommodate parties who are diligent.177 Unfortunately, ALCOA did 
not have a major precedential impact, and courts have generally continued 
to apply impracticability strictly.178 Without further development of the 
ALCOA principle, the scenarios and procedures for application of the 
imprévision-like remedy are unclear.179 Furthermore, ALCOA may fall 
outside of impracticability and into mistake of fact—similar to Mineral 
Park—or exceed the scope of impracticability, leaving judges with a large 
discretionary task absent legislative authorization.180 
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3. U.C.C. § 2-615  
Other cases have used impracticability as embodied in U.C.C. § 2-615 
for disputes involving goods.181 Although only applicable to contracts of 
sale involving goods, the spirit of § 2-615 has found its way into the 
Restatement on Contracts,182 leading it to affect the law of contract as a 
whole.183 Section 2-615 applies only to sellers, and provides: 
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation 
and subject to the preceding section on substituted performance: 
 
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller 
who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his 
duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been 
made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the 
non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the 
contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any 
applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or 
order whether or not it later proves to be invalid. 
 
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part 
of the seller's capacity to perform, he must allocate production 
and deliveries among his customers but may at his option 
include regular customers not then under contract as well as 
his own requirements for further manufacture. He may so 
allocate in any manner which is fair and reasonable. 
 
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be 
delay or non-delivery and, when allocation is required under 
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paragraph (b), of the estimated quota thus made available for 
the buyer.184 
In other words, no breach of contract occurs when an occurrence that 
was not assumed at the formation of the contract makes performance 
impracticable.185 Foreseeability of a supervening event is given more weight 
in § 2-615 to temper some of the rigidity in earlier American frustration 
cases where risk not foreseen was deemed risk assumed.186 Finally, a 
comment to § 2-615 supports the proposition that a court can make equitable 
adjustments to a contract when performance has become impracticable.187 
The adjustment idea is unsurprising because of  the U.C.C.’s German 
influence.188 The comment likely acknowledges Geschäftsgrundlage, or 
“contractual basis or foundation,”189 which German courts have used to 
adapt contracts.190 
Despite the fact that § 2-615 expressly authorizes relief when 
circumstances become impracticable and impliedly recommends in its 
comments more flexibility in the analysis, obtaining relief in court under § 
2-615 is incredibly difficult.191 In Iowa Electric Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., a 
seller argued for contract modification after the cost of yellowcake192 
reached 50–58% of the original contract price.193 The court ruled against the 
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seller, denying requests for adjustment or discharge of the contract.194 
Similarly, in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum 
Industries, Inc., the court refused to excuse the defendant under § 2-615 
when costs of condenser tubing for a nuclear plant reached 38% of the 
contract price.195 The Louisiana federal court applied the U.C.C. because 
the parties’ contract contained a New York choice of law provision.196 The 
court reasoned that commercial impracticability was not met because it 
required an “extreme and unreasonable” expense.197 Louisiana Power 
does reveal, however, two tendencies of Louisiana courts: (1) conflation 
of § 2-615 with common law impracticability and frustration; and (2) 
overemphasis of comment 4,198 explaining that increased costs do not 
excuse performance, in the official comments of § 2-615.199  
The practices illustrated in Louisiana Power are unsurprising since 
§ 2-615 is, indeed, an exception to the general rule of enforcement of 
contracts.200 As such, courts still apply the law narrowly to traditional 
categories such as war, embargo, and crop failure.201 When a court departs 
from the old categories and into situations of increased economic expense, 
the remedy remains discharge of the obligation.202 Nevertheless, in 
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the seller); see also Litvinoff, supra note 15, at 22 (noting the drafter of the 
U.C.C.’s influence of German civil law). 
 202. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 826 F. 2d 239, 
278–79 (4th Cir. 1987). In a contract to reprocess spent nuclear fuel, 




extraordinary circumstances, some commentators suggest that courts should 
consider the more equitable remedies beyond dissolution that § 2-615 and, 
by implication of the Restatement, commercial impracticability may 
allow.203 Section 2-615’s use of the term “impracticable” appears to 
influence courts to remain attached to the historically stricter common law 
conception.204 Comment 4 to § 2-615, which states, in pertinent part, that 
“[i]ncreased cost alone does not excuse performance,” seems to overshadow 
other comments.205 The suggestion of remedies mirroring imprévision, such 
as renegotiation and adjustment under good faith, are in comment 6, and the 
comment appears not to include the majority of sellers’ arguments in 
court.206 Conceivably, § 2-615’s comment scheme is not conducive to 
increased flexibility because the comments are not the law.207 Judges 
therefore have discretion to incorporate comments into case law, and the 
jurisprudence illustrates that courts thus far have neglected comment 6.208 
As it stands, use of § 2-615 is best described by Louisiana Power, which 
aptly noted that there is “little encouragement to those who . . . wield the 
sword of commercial impracticability.”209 Louisiana should also look at 
international contemporaries to § 2-615 in order to observe potentially 
better constructed and more effective law on impracticability. 
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B. CISG and Unidroit 
The CISG is an international treaty ratified by 88 nations.210 The treaty 
is an important source of law because it represents one of the best attempts 
to bridge common and civil law legal principles.211 The United States 
ratified the CISG and made it the law in all 50 states in litigation involving 
international transactions of goods.212 
Article 79 of the CISG addresses force majeure situations.213 Although 
article 79 was likely designed to deal with cases of impossibility, 
contemporary decisions and scholarship point to article 79 as a law also 
addressing hardship.214 The article provides, in pertinent part, that “a party 
is not liable for a failure to perform . . . if he proves that the failure was 
due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably 
[have accounted for the impediment].”215 The article applies only during 
the period in which the impediment exists and only protects a party from 
damages.216 An aggrieved party may rely on the article solely to prevent 
damages for non-performance.217 Therefore, non-performance can still be 
grounds for dissolution and even revision of the contract.218 In contrast to 
U.C.C. § 2-615, the frustration doctrine, and the doctrine of 
impracticability, the text of article 79 of the CISG suggests that dissolution 
is not the only remedy.219 For example, the law suspends performance if 
the impediment is temporary and preserves all judicial remedies, such as 
revision or dissolution, excluding damages.220 
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In practice however, courts have inconsistently interpreted CISG 
article 79, particularly in defining “impediment.”221 For instance, German 
courts have defined the term as encompassing force majeure, economic 
impossibility, and excessive onerousness.222 An Italian court defined 
impediment as absolute impossibility.223 Controversially, the United 
States has interpreted article 79 to be equivalent to U.C.C. § 2-615.224 
Criticism of the United States’s interpretation stems from the federal 
district court’s blatant violation of article 7 of the CISG by superimposing 
the U.C.C. over the convention and defying the article 7 rule that the CISG 
is to be interpreted with respect to its international character.225 
From an American perspective, the most debated case applying CISG 
article 79 comes from the Belgian Supreme Court.226 In 2009, the Belgian 
Supreme Court held that a 70% increase in the market price of steel tubes 
created a sufficient economic difficulty to qualify as an impediment under 
article 79.227 As a result, the court essentially applied theorie l’imprévision228 
and ordered the parties to renegotiate the contract.229 An opinion that the 
preeminent authority on the treaty, the CISG Advisory Council, issued230 
appeared to provoke the Belgian decision, and both the decision and the 
council’s opinion elicited an intense negative reaction from American 
commentators.231 
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Fears regarding a liberal interpretation of article 79 promoting 
imprévision, and that such an interpretation is unfounded in the law, may be 
unwarranted. CISG Advisory Opinion No. 7, which allegedly emboldened 
Belgium, does not promote loose application of article 79 to situations in 
which performance becomes excessively difficult.232 The opinion 
articulates that economic fluctuations creating hardship typically do not 
create impediments and that a radical, rare case is necessary to trigger 
article 79.233 Nevertheless, the opinion states that a rare case of hardship 
could be an impediment, and a remedy that adjusts the contract can be 
easily reached through the CISG’s provision on good faith and article 
79(5).234 Article 7 instructs courts to observe good faith in trade,235 and 
when read together with article 79(5), which only excludes damages as a 
remedy, adjustment of the contract is an available remedy for the parties.236 
CISG article 79 broadens the scope of remedies overall but still 
recognizes the sanctity of the parties’ agreement.237 The law’s major 
weakness, however, is its inconsistent application among the ratifying 
nations.238 Although one may view varying application as a feature of 
international law, inconsistent application of the CISG runs counter to its 
goal of uniformly and consistently applying the body of law for those 
engaged in global transactions.239 The implicit rather than explicit 
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authorization of remedies, such as contract revision, seems to deter many 
courts from pursuing remedies beyond traditional dissolution of the 
contract.240  
Similar to § 2-615’s influence on the Restatement of Contracts, the 
CISG influenced the Unidroit Principles.241 Although modeled after the 
CISG, the Unidroit Principles are broader in scope—dealing with all 
contracts, not just the sale of goods—and progress the law further than the 
CISG, yielding an international restatement of contracts.242 Article 7.1.7 
of Unidroit mirrors, almost verbatim, article 79 of the CISG, but Unidroit 
explicitly characterizes its article as a provision for force majeure.243 
Unidroit then departs from the CISG by adding article 6.2.2 on hardship.244 
Article 6.2.2 defines hardship as “where the occurrence of events 
fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contract either because the cost 
of a party’s performance has increased or because the value of the 
performance a party receives has diminished.”245 The article goes on to 
condition hardship on lack of foreseeability and no assumption of risk.246 
If the conditions for hardship are satisfied, article 6.2.3 first gives the 
aggrieved party the right to request renegotiations, followed by the ability 
to challenge in court.247 The court is allowed to either terminate the 
contract or adapt the contract for the parties.248 Thus, Chapter 6, Section 2 
of the principles places imprévision in black ink, and its traces are apparent 
in the French Revision of 2016.249 
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C. French Revision of 2016 
In 2016, France revised its Civil Code’s provisions on contracts to 
much fanfare.250 The revision was the first change to the law of obligations 
since 1804.251 Among the major changes was the addition of Civil Code 
article 1195, which explicitly codifies imprévision.252 Article 1195 is the 
first addition of excuse for performance in French private contract law 
since the codification of force majeure over 200 years ago.253 
1. Imprévision: From Isolated Doctrine to Code Article 
Before the reform, imprévision was exclusively a doctrinal construct, 
applied occasionally in French administrative law—law governing 
disputes between public and private entities.254 In 1876, the French 
Supreme Court rejected imprévision in private law when it overturned a 
lower court’s decision to adjust a long-term contract involving a canal.255 
French jurists were content with the decision, indulging the legal fiction 
that parties neither envision a contract revision nor account for the future 
at the time of contracting.256 Instead, the Conseil d’Etat sanctioned 
imprévision 40 years later in the administrative law case of Compagnie 
Générale d’Éclairage de Bordeaux v. Ville de Bordeaux.257 The case 
involved skyrocketing coal prices after World War I, and the contract at 
issue was between an electric company and a city.258 The court held that 
the increased costs exceeded the amount the parties could have 
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contemplated when contracting259 and remanded the case to adjust the 
contract if the parties failed to renegotiate.260 The leading explanation for 
the rationale is that imprévision in administrative law seeks ultimately to 
protect the public interest in having public services, such as electricity, 
rather than the unfair financial circumstances that may befall a party to a 
private contract.261 
In legislatively incorporating imprévision into the private law, France 
draws a sharp distinction between imprévision and force majeure like the 
Unidroit Principles.262 Significantly, the distinction means the French did 
not expand force majeure; force majeure continues to govern situations of 
strict impossibility, whereas imprévision exists as a new and separate 
right.263 The distinction means also that events making performance truly 
impossible fall outside of imprévision and must be governed by force 
majeure and its remedies.264 The distinction follows other models 
including Italy265 and Unidroit.266 
2. A Law Both Suppletive and Mandatory 
Although separate from the force majeure provision, French Civil 
Code article 1195 retains some ability to modify contracts from the default 
rule, just like for force majeure.267 Article 1195 provides:  
Should a change in circumstances that was unforeseeable at the 
time the contract was concluded make its execution excessively 
onerous for a party who had not agreed to assume the risk, that 
party may ask the other party that the contract be re-negotiated. 
While the contract is being re-negotiated, the former party 
continues to carry out its obligations. 
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In the event of a refusal or the failure to re-negotiate, the parties 
may agree that the contract will be dissolved on the date and under 
the conditions they lay down, or they may ask by common 
agreement that the court proceed with its adaptation. If they fail to 
reach an agreement within a reasonable time, the court may, at the 
request of one party, revise the contract or put an end to it, at the 
time and under the conditions the court will determine.268 
Although article 1195 is a general, mandatory rule for applying 
imprévision, the law itself is likely suppletive in nature.269 In other words, 
the rule is a default provision, but parties can opt out of imprévision.270 
Thus, article 1195 provides a course of action only in an agreement that 
does not exclude the provision.271 Nevertheless, scholars are split as to the 
extent to which parties can opt out of the article.272 The suppletive nature 
of the article helps mitigate some of the criticism of the revision involving 
contractual unpredictability—potentially encouraging parties to renege on 
bad deals.273 Commentators doubt, however, that parties could completely 
exclude French Civil Code article 1195 in a contract without providing 
another mechanism for relief if circumstances become excessively 
onerous.274 The majority of scholars seem to favor an ability to opt out of 
the clause, allowing judicial interference with the contract.275 
3. The Spirit and Effect of Article 1195 
Many commentators agree that the change in law needed to originate 
from the legislature rather than the courts.276 French courts were seen as 
unfit to develop a structured review mechanism in imprévision scenarios 
to sufficiently address uncertainty issues.277 In a few recent but isolated 
decisions before the revision, however, the French Supreme Court ordered 
parties to renegotiate and adapt contracts under the duty of good faith when 
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economic conditions made performance more onerous.278 Ultimately, article 
1195 has three essential elements: (1) excessive onerousness; (2) 
unpredictability; and (3) no assumption of risk.279 Throughout the article’s 
drafting, the guiding principles were the common will of the parties and the 
idea that the parties themselves will negotiate the best solution.280 Unlike 
the U.C.C., which applies only to the sale of goods, article 1195 was 
intended to apply to all contracts, with the idea that the code article’s 
language and construction provides adequate restrictions to curb fears of 
contractual uncertainty.281 Article 1195 seeks to impose an objective 
standard that emphasizes the amount of change and the severity of impact 
on the contract instead of an approach emphasizing the consequences arising 
from the detrimental effect on one of the parties.282  
The drafters of article 1195 considered three circumstances to trigger the 
article: (1) one that fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contract; (2) 
one that renders the contract profoundly unbalanced because of a change of 
reasonably unforeseeable circumstances; or (3) one rendering the contract 
excessively onerous.283 In the end, the drafters rejected the first two methods 
and chose the third, inspired by article 1467 of the Italian Civil Code.284 
French courts must now decide how to interpret “excessively onerous.”285 
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One interpretation is that “excessively onerous” means performance has 
become tremendously expensive, such as the price of materials skyrocketing, 
or total worthlessness, in a case of rapid inflation.286 Another interpretation 
involves a measure of the balance between performance and counter-
performance or whether the value of the transaction substantially favors one 
party over another.287 The last interpretation, which the text least supports, is 
that “excessively onerous” includes situations in which a party becomes 
disinterested in a contract because of a change in circumstances.288 The most 
probable interpretation falls within the realm of a fundamental alteration or 
profound imbalance in the contract.289 
The final two elements are straightforward. Unpredictability under 
article 1195 is essentially a strict reasonableness standard.290 The occurrence 
should be so exceptional that the parties would not have normally 
considered it.291 The standard appears to have a subjective prong, requiring 
a reasonableness analysis particular to the type of party contracting and the 
type of business involved in the contract.292 No assumption of risk 
requirement means article 1195 will not apply if the parties explicitly or 
implicitly accepted the chance of the onerous circumstance.293 As for 
implicit acceptance of risk, commentators assert that implicit acceptance 
should not apply when circumstances completely change the original 
balance between chance of gain and risk of loss.294 Speculative or aleatory 
contracts almost always involve an implicit acceptance of risk, and if article 
1195 could apply at all, the facts would need to be extraordinary.295 
The French reform provides more flexibility than other areas of law, 
both in the circumstances in which the law can apply and in the freedom 
to mitigate the law’s effects.296 The variety of options for interpretation of 
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the elements gives courts the freedom to develop jurisprudence.297 At the 
same time, article 1195 forces courts to consider different remedies to 
situations beyond traditional force majeure.298 Although article 1873 of 
the Louisiana Civil Code speaks only to exemption of liability when 
fortuitous events—force majeure—make performance impossible, article 
1195 of the French Civil Code promotes a host of remedies for situations 
of contractual hardship not amounting to force majeure within a tidy 
framework.299 
IV. LOUISIANA’S SOLUTION SHOULD FOLLOW THE FRENCH REVISION 
In light of all the potential approaches, Louisiana should follow the 
French model.300 The French solution is more comprehensive than the 
U.C.C. because article 1195 of the French Civil Code applies to all 
contracts and parties,301 but § 2-615 applies only to sales of goods and 
sellers.302 With applicability to both parties, a buyer is protected when an 
extreme event makes the buyer’s purchase worthless.303 Section 2-615 
does not, on its face, promote the conservation of the contract; the 
provision addresses only a release of liability from damages.304 Any 
conservation must be extrapolated from the comments of § 2-615, but 
courts have not used the comments to preserve and adjust contracts.305 
Article 1195 eliminates uncertainty with regard to preservation because it 
promotes contract conservation with revision in the text of the law itself 
rather than in the comments, which do not have the force of law.306 
Article 1195 of the French revision, like the Unidroit Principles, 
includes strengths from article 79 of the CISG but expands beyond the 
CISG. First, article 1195 uses a distinct legal term of art: “excessively 
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onerous.”307 Drafters chose this term, from the Italian Civil Code and 
mirroring the language in Unidroit, specifically to expand the covered 
circumstances that could qualify beyond traditional force majeure.308 
Similarly, drafters chose the CISG’s use of “impediment” to distinguish 
article 79 of the CISG from frustration and impossibility.309 Article 1195’s 
use of the term “excessively onerous” makes it unlikely that Louisiana 
courts will completely adopt impracticability or frustration. Also similar 
to the CISG, article 1195 promotes the continuance of the contract even 
though there is an obstacle to performance.310 
Another great strength of article 1195 is that it preserves force majeure 
and creates a separate right.311 Article 1195 does not need to straddle force 
majeure and imprévision like article 79 of the CISG.312 Although both 
promote contract conservation, article 1195 encourages performance 
while the parties renegotiate around the obstacle. Article 1195 operates 
accordingly because it does not apply to impossibility, whereas article 79 
must account for impossibility.313 Another strength of decoupling force 
majeure and imprévision is that Louisiana jurisprudence and tradition are 
preserved.314 Leaving the jurisprudence concerning force majeure intact 
ensures consistency in the law by keeping present Louisiana Civil Code 
article 1873, thus providing the remedy of dissolution for actual 
impossibility. 
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Ultimately, article 1195 is legally consistent with Louisiana contract 
law and the Civil Code.315 A simple codification of common law 
frustration or impracticability would be redundant because the doctrines 
equate to failure of cause.316 Although rarely invoking it, Louisiana 
recognizes failure of cause and its limited remedy of dissolution.317 Article 
1195 instead promotes the good faith requirement of the Code and makes 
explicit the implicit condition that the obligation exists as long as the 
circumstances remain unchanged.318 Thus, article 1195 codifies much of 
Professor Litvinoff’s rationale for expanding force majeure with the 
addition of one simple article.319 
A. Reasons to Expand the Law to Imprévision 
Several general principles support the codification of imprévision.320 
First, imprévision combats the legal fiction that parties want to maintain 
their written agreement even in the event of unforeseeable, radical 
circumstances.321 Though imprévision embodies a different assumption—
that parties did not envision a change in circumstances—it forces parties 
and judges to consider that parties likely want to achieve the goals of the 
original contract via different means.322 Second, imprévision explicitly 
promotes good faith and coordination between contracting parties.323 
Third, imprévision allows a court to intervene when the failure to do so 
could jeopardize a contract whose performance is necessary for the public 
interest.324 Article 1195 assumes the more realistic premise that parties 
consent to what they know at the time of contracting—a relative stability 
in the state of affairs.325 
The leading criticism to article 1195’s approach and imprévision is 
uncertainty in contracts because of a perceived weakness in the binding 
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force of parties’ agreements.326 Although uncertainty seems to invite a 
flood of litigation, some studies in comparative law have concluded that 
jurisdictions with imprévision have not seen more litigation.327 Moreover, 
other parts of the article’s language alleviate the concern of uncertainty 
despite the fact that at its core, article 1195 is a mandatory rule that the 
overarching principle of good faith requires.328  
First, the initial element—that performance become “excessively 
onerous”—will likely require an analysis of profound imbalance in the 
contract, leaving only a somewhat more generous interpretation of the 
code than the present force majeure analysis.329 Second, article 1195 
requires that performance of the original obligation continue while 
renegotiation takes place.330 As a result, the obligation is still in force and 
binding, which may serve to deter a party from invoking article 1195 when 
the circumstances are not truly exceptional.331 Third, many of the remedies 
in article 1195 can be suppletive.332 If parties include their own 
mechanisms for remedying hardship, those mechanisms can prevail over 
the article even if the mechanism excludes judicial intervention.333 In 
addition, the controversial judicial intervention clause is discretionary, as 
indicated by the use of the word “may.”334 Furthermore, judicial 
intervention involving a juridical act335 and a disagreement among parties 
is not completely foreign in Louisiana law.336 In the law of successions, 
the Louisiana Civil Code permits a judge to order a partition of donated 
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property after five years if the coheirs cannot agree among themselves how 
to administer or partition the property.337 Finally, article 1195 does not 
apply under circumstances in which parties assumed the risk of a 
change.338 Consequently, if a party explicitly accepts a risk in the terms of 
the contract, the party cannot avail itself of article 1195.339  
B. Placement in the Louisiana Civil Code 
Having decided to codify imprévision, one issue remains: the 
placement of the new article within the Louisiana Civil Code. Lawmakers 
should place the article after article 1983 under Book III, Title IV, Chapter 
8, Section 1: General Effects of Contracts.340 This section is analogous to 
the placement of article 1195 in the French Civil Code.341 Additionally, 
article 1983 provides a relevant principle to preface the exception of an 
article 1195 analog: “Contracts have the effect of law for the parties and 
may be dissolved only through the consent of the parties or on grounds 
provided by law. Contracts must be performed in good faith.”342 Placement 
after article 1983 is better than placement after article 1873 on force 
majeure because article 1873 is in Chapter 6 on extinction of obligations 
and Section 2 on impossibility of performance.343 Article 1873 is likewise 
located in Title III on obligations in general, making it applicable beyond 
conventional contract law, such as tort law.344 Article 1195, contrarily, 
promotes the continuance of an obligation, applies when performance is 
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still possible but excessively onerous, and pertains only to conventional 
obligations.345 
CONCLUSION 
Adopting an analog to the French imprévision in the Louisiana Civil 
Code would save Louisiana families like the Schencks from ruin.346 In a 
state in which unprecedented disasters are becoming more common,347 
Louisiana needs a solution that encourages the continuation of parties’ 
agreements but also recognizes the commercial reality that unforeseen 
circumstances can change parties’ positions drastically.348 Ultimately, 
Louisiana’s oldest and original source of legal inspiration, France, 
provides the most innovative, legally compatible, and comprehensive 
solution, which should serve as the leading model for a revision to the 
Louisiana Civil Code.349 Furthermore, the French solution codifies what 
the architect of Louisiana’s force majeure law, Professor Litvinoff, 
envisioned.350 Finally, codification would express that Louisianans want 
flexibility when disaster strikes, and Louisiana courts will not ignore this 
expression.351 Louisiana families do not need an act of God to help them 
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in post-disaster contracts; they need a simple, single article revision to the 
Civil Code. 
 
Christopher R. Handy* 
 
 
                                                                                                             
for helping curate several of the contemporary French sources in this comment. 
This comment is dedicated to my parents Ann Lafranca and Robert Handy for 
always encouraging my pursuit of scholarship, and to the memory of Professor 
Saul Litvinoff, whose writings and commentary on the civil law have inspired not 
only this topic but many of my thoughts on Louisiana civil law. 
 
